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Failure to Object: Tribal Waiver of
Immunity by Participation in
Arbitration
Oglala Sioux Tribe v. C & W Enterprises, Inc.'
I. INTRODUCTION
In Oglala Sioux Tribe v. C & W Enterprises, Inc. (Oglala), the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit dealt with whether a tribe's affirmative participa-
tion in the arbitration process waived its sovereign immunity as to arbitration and
enforcement of an arbitration award in state court.2 Previously, courts have main-
tained that the existence of an arbitration clause in a commercial contract was
sufficient to waive tribal immunity, but they relied on the explicit wording of the
agreement itself.3 In the instant decision, this precedent applied to three construc-
tion contracts that contained an explicit choice of law provision, but the real diffi-
culty lay in a fourth construction contract that did not compel arbitration or speci-
fy where an arbitration agreement could be enforced.4
The Eighth Circuit ruled that the commercial contracts between the Oglala
Tribe and C & W Enterprises that contained choice of law provisions waived the
Tribe's immunity.5 The fourth contract did not contain a choice of law provision.
The court ruled that not objecting to arbitration but instead raising its own coun-
terclaims waived the Tribe's immunity. 6 The Eighth Circuit held that by submit-
ting to arbitration, the Tribe also submitted to the rules governing the arbitration.
7
The court ruled that since the arbitration rules allowed for enforcement of the
arbitration agreements in any court in the jurisdiction, the Tribe had waived its
sovereign immunity to state court enforcement. Congress has repeatedly urged
courts to recognize the bounds of tribal sovereignty, but with this decision, the
Eighth Circuit delved into the conduct of the Tribe rather than the terms to which
the parties had agreed.9 The expansion of tribal waiver to cover the conduct of the
Tribe continues to erode the doctrine of tribal sovereignty.'
0
Additionally, by allowing a state court to enforce an arbitration agreement
where no explicit language in the contract provided for one, the Eighth Circuit
1. 542 F.3d 224 (8th Cir. 2008).
2. Id. at 230-31.
3. See C & L Enters. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 532 U.S. 411, 418-19
(2001).
4. Oglala, 542 F.3d at 227, 229.
5. Id. at 231.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 231-32.
9. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 (1978).
10. See Demontiney v. U.S. ex rel. Dep't. of Interior, 255 F.3d 801, 811 (9th Cir. 2001) ("There is a
strong presumption against waiver of tribal sovereign immunity.").
1
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expanded waiver to the act of proceeding with the arbitration." I The result is that
by allowing such a broad interpretation of waiver, the dispute was forced to be
resolved entirely off the reservation. A suitable alternative would be to explore
tribal remedies rather than exposing the Tribe to further state and federal liabili-
ty.1
2
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In 2002, the Oglala Sioux Tribe' 3 (Tribe) and C & W Enterprises, Inc. 14 (C &
W) entered into four contracts for road construction on the Pine Ridge Reserva-
tion.15 The contracts were designated the Multi-Gravel project, Manderson to
Wounded Knee project (Manderson), Cuny Table project (Cuny), and the Base
and Blotter project. 16 The Multi-Gravel, Manderson and Cuny projects each pro-
vided clauses stating the Tribe waived its immunity in connection with disputes
arising from the contracts' 7 and clauses stating that the Tribe agreed to a specified
Claims Resolution Process. 18 The Base and Blotter contract provided that dis-
putes under that contract would be governed by Tribal law; if no such laws exist,
"then the Tribal Court will apply South Dakota law as a guide."'
' 9
Disputes arose over performance of the contract, and the parties submitted the
dispute to non-binding mediation by the Tribal Executive Committee. z2 The
Committee was unable to resolve the dispute and consequently, in January 2006,
C & W filed claims with the American Arbitration Association (AAA) on all four
contracts for the sum of $6 million. 2 '
11. Oglala, 542 F.3d at 233.
12. Catherine T. Struve, Tribal Immunity and Tribal Courts, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 137, 181-82 (2004).
13. The Oglala Sioux Tribe receives funds through the Bureau of Indian Affairs and is a federally-
recognized Native American tribe. Oglala, 542 F.3d at 226.
14. C & W Enterprises, Inc. is a Native American-owned business. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. The waiver read:
The Oglala Sioux Tribe grants a limited waiver of its immunity for any and all disputes arising
from this Contract, including the interpretation of the agreement and work completed or to be
completed under the Contract; provided, however, that such waiver extends only to the Oglala
Sioux Tribe and Transportation's specific obligations under the Contract; and further provided
that such waiver shall extend only to the extent necessary to permit enforcement by the Subcon-
tractor.
Id.
18. Id. The Claims Resolution Process required the parties to first bring any claims to the Tribe's
Executive Committee for non-binding mediation; if it was not resolved at this point, then any claims
were to be brought to the South Dakota Federal District Court. Id. If the Federal District Court lacked
jurisdiction, the contract provided that the claims would be submitted to an arbitrator under Construc-
tion Industry Arbitration Rules and that the arbitration award "shall be final, and judgment may be
entered upon it in accordance with the applicable law in any court having jurisdiction thereof." Id.
There is also a provision that if the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules are not complied with in a
timely matter, the party waives the right to arbitration and judgment will be entered in the amount of
the dispute. Id. at 226-27.
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The tribe agreed to arbitrate all four contracts and asserted a breach of con-
tract counterclaim on the Base and Blotter contract for $1.8 million. 22 The Tribe
moved to dismiss multiple claims through sovereign immunity, but immunity was
not asserted for the Base and Blotter contract.23 The Tribe wrote a legal memo-
randum to the arbitrator that stated that the limited waiver only applied to the Tri-
bal Court, but they were willing to resolve the Base and Blotter contract on the
merits. 24 It was not until June 23, after five months of arbitration, that the Tribe
moved to dismiss the Base and Blotter claims through sovereign immunity.' The
arbitrator found that the Tribe's participation in the arbitration of the Base and
Blotter contract waived its immunity.
26
On August 21, the Tribe filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of
South Dakota to enjoin the arbitrator from hearing claims related to the Base and
Blotter contract.27 The case was dismissed due to lack of federal jurisdiction, and
the Eighth Circuit affirmed.28
The arbitration resumed on August 30, 2006, in Sioux Falls, South Dakota.
29
On January 29, the arbitrator entered a final judgment in favor of C & W for
$1,250,552.58.30 On the same day, C & W filed in South Dakota state court to
confirm the award in conformance with the state's Uniform Arbitration Act.
31
The Tribe did not answer after being served; a default judgment was entered on
May 29, 2007.32 C & W tried to collect on the judgment by obtaining executions
on Tribe property located elsewhere in South Dakota.33 On April 30, 2007, the
Tribe filed a motion to vacate the award in Oglala Sioux Tribal Court.34 C & W
attempted to defend the judgment, but on July 26, 2007, the award was vacated.35
On March 29, 2008, the Supreme Court of the Tribe affirmed the vacating the
award, but it remanded back to the Tribal Court concerning the arbitrability of the
Base and Blotter contract.
36
On March 16, 2007, the Tribe filed in the U.S. District Court for the District
of South Dakota on the grounds that the state court did not have jurisdiction. 37 On
August 16, the Tribe moved to stay C & W's suit, and on September 10, the dis-





26. Id. at 227-28. The Arbitrator had the ability to determine jurisdiction and arbitrability under
Construction Industry Arbitration Rule R-8(a). Id. at 227. "A party must object to the jurisdiction of
the arbitrator or to the arbitrability of a claim or counterclaim no later than the filing of the answering
statement to the claim or counterclaim that gives rise to the objection." Id.
27. Id. at 228.









37. Id. They sought a declaratory judgment stating that the state court did not have jurisdiction to
confirm the award; injunctive relief preventing state court action; a declaration that the Tribal Court
had exclusive jurisdiction; or that the U.S. District Court vacate the award. ld.
No. 2]
3
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tion against any future action. 38 The district court stated that the parties must
exhaust their Tribal Court remedies first.3 9 C & W appealed the district court's
findings to the Eighth Circuit.
40
The Eighth Circuit held that the Tribe waived its sovereign immunity in all
four contracts by the explicit contract provisions and by active participation in the
arbitration process and that industry rules stated the state court had jurisdiction to
confirm the award and enter judgment. 41
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Sovereign Immunity Generally
The United States has normally granted Native American tribes sovereign
immunity to allow them to function as independent states. 42 This immunity pro-
tects the tribe from a wide range of disruptive lawsuits and even extends outside
43of Indian Country. A tribe has immunity unless the tribe waives its immunity or
Congress has abrogated the immunity."a
One of the earliest cases to explore tribal immunity was Turner v. United
45States. In this case, the Creek Nation made a law that its citizens could enclose a
one square-mile property without charge, but any larger enclosure was prohi-
bited.46 Turner formed an agreement with 100 Creeks, which was approved by the
Tribal judge, for 256,000 acres with an eighty-mile enclosure.47 Members of the
Tribe were displeased with the large enclosure and interfered with Turner's build-
ing the fence.48 The Tribe refused to pay any claims to Turner so he brought suit
in the Court of Claims. 49 The case reached the U.S. Supreme Court, which ruled
that the Creek Nation not only was free from liability due to "mob violence" but
also for failure to keep the peace.
50
The branch of government most directly responsible for issues of tribal sove-
reignty was discussed in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez.51 Julia Martinez, a
38. Id. at 228-29.
39. Id. at 229.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 233.
42. See Theresa R. Wilson, Nations Within a Nation: The Evolution of Tribal Immunity, 24 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 99, 100 (2000); 1-4 MATTHEW BENDER, COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN
LAW § 4.01 (1997).
43. 1-7 MATTHEW BENDER, COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 7.05 (1997).
44. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 59 (1978); COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note
43, § 7.05.
45. 248 U.S. 354 (1919).
46. Id. at 355.
47. Id. at 355-56.
48. Id. at 356.
49. Id. at 357. Turner brought suit for damage to the fence caused by "mob violence" and the failure
of the Creek nation to prevent this destruction. Id. The Court of Claims is the former name of the U.S.
Court of Federal Claims, which handles claims against the government. See U.S. COURT OF FED.
CLAIMS, UNITED STATES COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS: THE PEOPLE'S COURT 2, available at
http://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/sites/defaultles/court info/Court-HistoryBrochure.pdf.
50. Turner, 248 U.S. at 357-58.
51. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
[Vol. 2009
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member of the Santa Clara Pueblo, married a Navajo.52 The Santa Clara Pueblo
Tribe passed an ordinance that prevented their children from becoming part of the
Tribe even though they lived on the reservation. 53 Martinez filed suit in U.S. dis-
trict court, but the court found for the Tribe on the merits. 54 The Supreme Court
stated, "Congress' authority over Indian matters is extraordinarily broad, and the
role of courts in adjusting relations between and among tribes and their members
correspondingly restrained."5 5 The Court found that unless Congress clearly in-
tended to abridge tribal sovereignty, tribal sovereignty should be upheld.56 The
notion that tribal sovereignty should be abrogated by Congress and not the courts
has played a large role in subsequent judicial opinions. 57
Further, in Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian
Tribe of Oklahoma, the Supreme Court again strengthened the doctrine of tribal
immunity. 58 The Potawatomi Tribe owned a convenience store that sold ciga-
rettes, but it did not collect the state's cigarette tax. 59 The Oklahoma Tax Com-
mission demanded $2.7 million for taxes on cigarette sales, but the Tribe filed in
U.S. district court to enjoin this action. 6° The Commission counterclaimed to
prevent the Tribe from selling cigarettes, but the Tribe moved to dismiss based on
sovereign immunity. When the Commission asked the Supreme Court to aban-
don sovereign immunity, the Court reaffirmed Congress' role in tribal relations.
62
The Court found that only Congress had the power to eliminate or narrow the
tribal immunity doctrine, and not the courts. 63 This was another indication that the
Supreme Court was unwilling to reduce tribal sovereignty.
B. Tribal Waiver of Sovereign Immunity
In Dillon v. Yankton Sioux Tribe Housing Authority,65 the Eighth Circuit
looked at how a tribe could waive its own tribal sovereignty. 66 Golman Dillon
worked for the Yankton Sioux Housing Authority modernizing tribal housing and
67was terminated. He brought a suit claiming that his termination was due to the
52. Id. at 52.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 54.
55. Id. at 72.
56. Id.
57. See Erik S. Laakkonen, Up in Smoke? Narragansett, Hicks, and the Erosion of Tribal Sovereign
Immunity, I I J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 453 (2008).
58. 498 U.S. 507 (1991).
59. Id. at 507.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 507-08.
62. Id. at 510.
63. Id. "Congress has always been at liberty to dispense with such tribal immunity or to limit it.
Although Congress has occasionally authorized limited classes of suits against Indian tribes, it has
never authorized suits to enforce tax assessments. Instead, Congress has consistently reiterated its
approval of the immunity doctrine." Id.
64. See Andrea M. Seielstad, The Recognition and Evolution of Tribal Sovereign Immunity Under
Federal Law: Legal, Historical, and Normative Reflections on a Fundamental Aspect of American
Indian Sovereignty, 37 TULSA L. REv. 661,697 (2002).
65. 144 F.3d 581 (8th Cir. 1998).
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fact that he was white. 68 Dillon claimed that the Tribe waived its tribal sovereign-
ty by a Tribal Resolution.69 He also said that they waived sovereign immunity to
civil rights violations by accepting federal funding.70 The Eighth Circuit held that
neither the Tribe's agreement with Housing and Urban Development nor the
Tribe's resolution explicitly waived the Tribe's immunity and dismissed the
case.
7 1
The doctrine of waiver was explored further in Kiowa v. Manufacturing
Technologies, Inc.72 The Kiowa Tribe bought stock from Manufacturing Tech-
nologies, and the chairman of its business committee signed the promissory note
in the Tribe's name.73 The note did not specify what law would govern a conflict,
and when the Kiowa defaulted, Manufacturing Technologies brought suit in state
Court. 74 The Kiowa moved to dismiss the suit due to sovereign immunity, but the
district court entered judgment for Manufacturing Technologies. 75 The Oklahoma
appellate court affirmed, and the case eventually reached the U.S. Supreme
Court.7 6 The Supreme Court stated that tribal immunity may no longer be appro-
priate in modem times due to the emergence of tribal enterprises. 77 The Court
found that there may be "a need to abrogate tribal immunity," but that only Con-
gress could act on these concerns. 78 The result in Kiowa has been explained as
deriving from the Court's distaste for the doctrine.79 The Supreme Court had
deferred to Congress' authority over Indian tribes, but over time it has become
weary of tribal immunity.80
C. Tribal Sovereignty and Arbitration
The U.S. Supreme Court built upon the Kiowa decision in C & L Enterprises
v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe.81 The Potawatomi Tribe entered into a
construction contract with C & L Enterprises [C & L] to install a roof on a build-
68. Id.
69. Id. The Tribal Resolution read:
The Committee hereby gives its irrevocable consent to allowing the Authority to sue and be sued
in its corporate name, upon any contract, claim or obligation arising out of its activities under this
ordinance and hereby authorizes the Authority to agree by contract to waive any immunity from
suit which it might otherwise have, but the Tribe shall not be liable for the debts or obligations of
the Authority.
Id. at 582-583.
70. Id. at 583.
71. Id. at 584.
72. Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., 523 U.S. 751 (1998).
73. Id. at 753. The stock purchased from Manufactured Technologies was not its own issue, but was
issued by Clinton, Sherman Aviation, Inc. Id.
74. Id. at 754.
75. Id.
76. Id. The case reached the U.S. Supreme Court only after the Oklahoma Supreme Court denied
review. Id.
77. Id. at 758.
78. Id.
79. See Wilson, supra note 42, at 127-28.
80. Id.; see Andrea M. Seielstad, The Recognition of Tribal Sovereign Immunity Under Federal
Law: Legal, Historical, and Normative Reflections on a Fundamental Aspect of American Indian
Sovereignty, 37 TULSA L. REV. 661, 711-12 (2002).
81. 532 U.S. 411 (2001).
[Vol. 2009
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ing outside of the reservation. 82 The contract said that "all claims or disputes
between Contractor [C & L] and the Owner [the Tribe] arising out of or relating to
the Contract, or breach thereof, shall be decided by arbitration .... "83 It also said
that disputes should be decided in accordance with construction arbitration rules.
84
There also was a choice of law provision that stated the contract would be go-
verned by the law of the area in which the project was located.85
The Tribe sought out a different company, and C & L submitted a demand for
arbitration.86 The Tribe asserted sovereign immunity but informed the arbitrator,
however, that it had defenses to C & L's claim. 87 The arbitrator ruled in favor of
C & L, and C & L sought enforcement in Oklahoma state court.88 The Tribe again
claimed immunity, but the district court entered judgment and the state court of
appeals affirmed. 89 Kiowa was decided during this time, and the court of appeals
concluded that the immunity had not been waived with sufficient clarity in con-
sideration of that case.
90
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari. 91 The Court said that the Tribe's
waiver must be clear in order to relinquish its immunity. 92 The Supreme Court
also stated, "the contract's choice-of-law clause makes it plain enough that a
'court having jurisdiction' to enforce the award in question is the Oklahoma state
court in which C & L filed suit."93 The Supreme Court held that under the agree-
ment, the Tribe had waived its sovereign immunity.
94
In Big Valley Band of Pomo Indians v. Superior Court,95 employees of a Po-
mo Tribe casino were dismissed allegedly without cause. 96 The employees
brought suit for breach of contract.9 7 Each one of their contracts contained an
arbitration clause and was signed by the general manager of the tribal casino in
98
which they worked. The employees alleged that these arbitration clauses waived
the Tribe's immunity.99 The California appellate court stated that the Tribe did
82. Id. at 414-15.
83. Id. at 415.
84. Id. The Construction Industry Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association are the
rules specified in the Contract. Id.
85. Id. "The contract shall be governed by the law of the place where the Project is located." Id.
86. Id. at 416.
87. Id. The court's opinion does not address what those defenses may have been. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 417.
90. Id. The Court relied on the Kiowa decision to determine the sufficient amount of clarity. Id.
91. C & L Enterprises v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 531 U.S. 956 (2000).
92. C & L Enterprises, 532 U.S. at 418.
93. Id. at419.
94. Id. at 418.
95. 35 Cal. Rptr. 3d 357 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).
96. Id. at 359.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 359-60.
Any claim or controversy arising out of or relating to any provisions of this Agreement, or breach
thereof, shall upon written demand be resolved by arbitration under the rules of the American Arbitra-
tion Association in San Francisco, California, and judgement [sic] on any award by the arbitrators may
be entered in any court having such jurisdiction. Arbitration costs shall be paid, one-half by each party
and the party losing the award will reimburse the prevailing party their half.
Id. at 364.
99. Id. at 359.
No. 2]
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not consent to arbitrate a breach of contract claim that arose out of the contract. 0 0
The court additionally held that failing to respond to arbitration demands was not
sufficient to waive tribal immunity.'1
0
In Ameriloan v. Superior Court,0 2 the California Department of Corrections
ordered five payday loan corporations that claimed they were wholly owned by
Indian tribes to cease doing business in the state for violating state law. 10 3 The
department filed suit in Los Angeles County Superior Court and received injunc-
tion relief against the corporations. 1 4 The Miami Tribe of Oklahoma appeared in
Tribal Court claiming the payday loan companies were immune under tribal sove-
reignty. 10 5 One of the Department's arguments against the Tribe was that the
payday loan companies had waived tribal sovereignty by placing an arbitration
clause in each of their customer contracts. 1°6 The California appellate court re-
jected this claim because they said that the arbitration clause only applied to par-
ties to the contract.' °7 The court also stated that the clause only provided consent
for an arbitration action and not for an action in state court.
0 8
California's narrow reading of waiver is in sharp contrast to what the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals decided in Oglala.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Oglala Sioux Tribe v. C & W Enterprises, Inc., t°9 the Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit began its review of the case by deciding a number of procedural
issues." 0 The court determined it had jurisdiction over the case through 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(a)."' The court applied an abuse of discretion standard of review.' 2 In
100. Id. at 365.
101. Id. at 365-66.
102. 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 572 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
103. Id. at 575-76.
104. Id. at 576.
105. Id. In support of its argument, the Tribe argued that the companies in question were wholly
owned by the Tribe and that all profits from the companies were used to fund essential governmental
services to the Tribe's members. Id.
106. id. at 577. The arbitration clause read:
Arbitration of All Disputes. You and we agree that any and all claims, disputes, or controversies
between you and us ... regarding this loan or any other loan you previously or may later obtain
from us ... shall be resolved by binding individual (and not joint) arbitration by and under the
Code of Procedure of the National Arbitration Forum. ... This agreement to arbitrate all disputes
shall apply no matter by whom or against whom the claim is filed.... Judgment upon the award
may be entered by any party in any court having jurisdiction.
Id. at 577 n.4.
107. Id. at 584.
108. Id.
109. 542 F.3d 224 (8th Cir. 2008).
110. Id. at 229-30.
111. Id. at 229. "Except as provided in subsection (c) and (d) of this section, the court of appeals shall
have jurisdiction of appeals from: 1) Interlocutory orders of the district courts of the United States...
"28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (2006).
112. Oglala, 542 F.3d at 229. "An abuse of discretion occurs where the district court rests its conclu-
sion on clearly erroneous factual findings or erroneous legal conclusions." Planned Parenthood Minn.,
N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 733 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting Lankford v. Sherman, 451 F.3d 496,
503-04 (8th Cir. 2006)).
[Vol. 2009
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order to receive a permanent injunction,, the court said that the party must show
"actual success on the merits."' 
sa
The court of appeals found that whether the Tribe had shown actual success
on the merits depended on whether the state court had jurisdiction." 4 The court
began by deciding if the tribe had voluntarily waived its immunity." 5 The court
of appeals in Oglala used C & L Enterprises as a comparison point to determine
whether there was a waiver.' 16 In applying C & L Enterprises, the court found
that the explicit waivers of immunity in three of the contracts were clear.117 In the
Base and Blotter contract, the court of appeals stated that there was no contractual
waiver of immunity. 18 The court said that the Tribe only consented to suit in
Tribal Court and that it was within the Tribe's power to limit its waiver of immun-
ity.1 9 The court then looked at the conduct of the Tribe. 20 The fact that the Tribe
raised no objection when confronted with the arbitration weighed against the
Tribe, according to the court. 12' Additionally, the court found that the by raising
its own arbitral counterclaims, the Tribe showed that they were participating in the
arbitration.1
22
Taking these facts into consideration, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit held that by actively participating in the arbitration and raising its
own claims, the Tribe voluntarily waived its immunity on that issue. 2 3 The court
also said that it would be unfair if, after an adverse decision, the Tribe was then
able to assert its immunity.'
24
Finding that the Tribe waived its immunity in all four contracts, the court of
appeals turned to the issue of whether the South Dakota state court had jurisdic-
tion to enforce the arbitration. 125 It decided that the parties made the decision to
use arbitration and so were bound by the applicable AAA Rules. 126 The AAA
rules provide that the parties consent to federal or state enforcement of any arbi-
tration decision; furthermore, the three contracts stated that judgment will be en-
tered in any court having jurisdiction.' 27 The court said that the contracts indicate
that the Tribe waived all immunity, not just to the Tribal Court, and provided no
express limitation to show otherwise. 128 The court stated that in agreeing to arbi-trate, the Tribe waived any immunity that it had. 129
113. Oglala, at 229.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 230-3 1.









126. Id. at 231-32.
127. Id.
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The court of appeals then addressed the Tribe's argument that their contracts
did not have the choice of law provisions present in C & L Enterprises.3" The
Eighth Circuit said that the Supreme Court's decision in C & L Enterprises did not
rely on the existence of a choice of law provision, as shown by the fact that it cited
other court decisions that did not included such a provision.1 3 1 The Eighth Circuit
also found that there was no ambiguity in the contract to necessitate a look into
the limitations of state waivers of immunity.132 It also stated that the fact that the
work took place on reservation land did not change whether the tribe waived its
immunity and whether the state court had jurisdiction. 133
After considering all of these arguments, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit stated that the state court had jurisdiction to enforce the arbitration
findings. 34 The Eighth Circuit vacated the permanent injunction and remanded
for further proceedings because the Tribe had waived its sovereign immunity in all




A. Balancing Tribal Interests and Policy Interests
Throughout American history, sovereignty has served as a way for the tribe to
maintain some form of independence while surrounded by a different set of laws
and beliefs.' 36 In order to continue to operate as independent states, tribes must be
immune from frivolous lawsuits that would disrupt their self-governance. 37 The
same concerns are shared by U.S. states and foreign powers, and as such they also
maintain sovereign immunity.' 38 On the other hand, the expansive scope of tribal
sovereign immunity has become a growing concern,' 39 The doctrine no longer
extends solely to activities on the reservation but also activities off the reservation
that affect a tribe. These concerns indicate why courts recently are more will-
ing to carve exceptions out of the sovereign immunity doctrine.
4 1
130. Id.
131. Id. at 232-33 (citing C & L Enters. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 532 U.S. 411, 417-
23 (2001). The cases cited by the Supreme Court in C & L Enterprises to note that the existence of an
arbitration agreement alone is dispositive were Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Val-U Construction Co., 50
F.3d 560, 562 (8th Cir. 1995); Sokaogon Gaming Enterprise Corp. v. Tushie-Montgomery Associates,
Inc., 86 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir.1996); and Val/Del, Inc. v. Superior Court, 703 P.2d 502 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1985). C& L Enters., 532 U.S. at 417.




136. See COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 43, § 7.05.
137. Wilson, supra note 42, at 99-100.
138. COHEN's HANDBOOK, supra note 43, § 7.05
139. Seielstad, supra note 64, at 681. "The result is that the sovereign immunity and sovereign au-
thority of American Indian tribes is reinforced by this decision, possibly to the extent acknowledged by
the dissent, that tribes may enjoy broader immunity than states, the federal government, and foreign
nations." Id.
140. COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 43, § 7.05
141. Wilson, supra note 42, at 101, 127. "Although the Court has to this point been hesitant to smite
its creation, it is clear the justices are losing their patience." Id. at 128. "If there was any doubt about
[Vol. 2009
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Courts generally have left the issue of sovereign immunity to Congress, but
they have placed broad hints that the doctrine needs to be curbed. 142 Even though
Congress has not acted, it is unlikely that courts will attempt broad sweeping ac-
tion, but will instead continue to cut back on the doctrine out of policy con-
cems. 14 3 In Oglala, the Eighth Circuit accomplished this by limiting tribal waiver
of its immunity. 44 The court found that allowing the Tribe to assert immunity
after it had begun the arbitration process brought up legitimate policy concerns. 145
For the Tribe, it would be a win-win situation because, in the event of an adverse
decision, they could back out claiming immunity. At the same time, this erodes
the process itself. The Eighth Circuit simply made sure that when the Tribe com-
mitted to a dispute resolution process, it was not later able to disengage from the
process if it were no longer favorable. 46 By no means does this mean that tribal
sovereign immunity lacks teeth: any waiver must still be clear and explicit. 47 A
tribe has the power to limit its waiver to certain claims or contracts. 48 In fact,
there is generally a strong presumption that a tribe has not waived its immunity.
49
A tribe is no longer able to accept the advantages of the dispute resolution process
without evoking some of the fundamental risks in the process.
Following C & L's precedent, the court in Oglala found that a tribe could
waive its sovereign immunity without stating those explicit words.' 5 ° Although
there is a belief that the judiciary should remain distant from issues of tribal sove-
reignty, 151 in this case the Eighth Circuit's decision to find a waiver by conduct is
consistent with decisions in other realms. 52 Unlike Big Valley Band of Pono
Indians v. Superior Court, where the Tribe failed to respond to arbitration de-
mands, 153 in this case the Tribe took affirmative action to participate in the
process. 
154
the Court's sympathies in relation to tribal interests, the 2001 Term resolved those doubts with great
clarity--tribal interests would find no quarter in the Supreme Court." Matthew L. Fletcher, The Su-
preme Court's Indian Problem, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 579, 588 (2008).
142. Seielstad, supra note 64, at 711-12.
143. See id. at 713-14.
144. See Oglala Sioux Tribe v. C & W Enters. 542 F.3d 224, 231 (8th Cir. 2008).
145. Id. "If a tribe were allowed to operate under AAA rules, and after an adverse decision assert
sovereign immunity and then walk away, it would convert sovereignty from a shield into a sword." Id.
146. Id.
147. See C & L Enters., 532 U.S. 411,418 (2001) ("Similarly, to relinquish its immunity, a tribe's
waiver must be 'clear."'); see also Dillon v. Yankton Sioux Tribe Housing Authority, 144 F.3d 581,
584 (8th Cir. 1998).
148. Oglala, 542 F.3d at 231.
149. See Demontiney v. U.S. ex rel. Dep't. of Interior, 255 F.3d 801, 811 (9th Cir. 2001). "There is a
strong presumption against waiver of tribal sovereign immunity." Id.
150. Oglala, 542 F.3d at 231.
151. See Joseph William Singer, Canons of Conquest: The Supreme Court's Attack on Tribal Sove-
reignty, 37 NEW. ENG. L. REV. 641, 664 (2003). "The Court does not need to strip tribes of their sove-
reignty without congressional authorization or tribal consent. Such attacks on tribal sovereignty are
contrary to American values and longstanding legal principles." Id. at 668.
152. See State ex. rel. Comm'rs of Land Office v. Jones, 176 P.2d 992, 999 (Okla. 1947).
153. See Big Valley Band of Pomo Indians v. Super. Ct., 35 Cal. Rptr. 3d 357, 365-66 (Cal. Ct. App.
2005).
154. Oglala, 542 F.3d at 227-28.
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B. Tribal Court Remedies and Alternative Dispute Resolution
The U.S. District Court for the District of South Dakota originally ruled that
the parties must exhaust Tribal Court remedies before the state court could con-
firm the arbitration award. 155 The Eighth Circuit stated that once the Tribe waived
its immunity by participating in arbitration, it also waived its immunity to state
court enforcement. 15 6 The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that tribal exhaustion
does not apply to state courts. 5 7 Still, in ruling that the waiver to undertake arbi-
tration extended to state court enforcement, the Eighth Circuit might have taken
the matter out of the appropriate forum. 158 The choice of law provision states that
"judgment may be entered upon it in accordance with the applicable law in any
court having jurisdiction thereof."' 159 In following C & L, the Eighth Circuit stated
that this was sufficiently clear for waiver. 16  In the instant case, the Base and
Blotter contract contained no indication that a judgment can be enforced anywhere
else besides the Tribal Court. 16 1 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
stated that because the Tribe participated in the arbitration, it in turn agreed to the
AAA arbitration rules, which then resulted in the tribe agreeing to state court en-
forcement.' 62 Each additional step of logic in this chain seems to be without
precedent.
Previously, the Supreme Court held that waivers must be "unequivocally ex-
pressed" and cannot be implied. 163 Here the tribe waived its sovereign immunity
by acquiescing to AAA arbitration rules through participation in arbitration."
This seems like an implied waiver and far from an unequivocal expression. In
Dillon, the Eighth Circuit stated that a tribe that receives federal funding and had a
contract with the Department of Housing and Urban Development that required it
to comply with civil rights laws and still had not waived its tribal sovereign im-
munity in a civil rights case. 165 In circumstances much like the facts in this case,
the court held that agreeing to comply with certain regulations did not waive the
tribe's sovereignty for a later action. 166 Just because the tribe appeared in the
arbitration should not mean that the waiver should apply in a subsequent proceed-
ing in a different forum.'
67
An equitable resolution for the Base and Blotter contract would have been to
enforce the arbitration in tribal court. Tribal courts provide an environment that
155. Id. at 228-29.
156. Id. at 232.
157. Meyer & Assocs., Inc. v. Coushatta Tribe, 992 So. 2d 446, 450 (La. 2008) ("As related by the
court of appeal, the United States Supreme Court has never held that the exhaustion of tribal remedies
doctrine applies to the states.").
158. See Oglala, 542 F.3d at 233.
159. Id. at 226.
160. Id. at 233.
161. Id. at 227.
162. Id. at 231-32.
163. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978).
164. Oglala, 542 F.3d at 232.
165. Dillon v. Yankton Sioux Tribe Hous. Auth., 144 F.3d 581, 584 (8th Cir. 1998).
166. Id.
167. See Ameriloan v. Super. Ct., 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 572, 584 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
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seems a perfect forum for alternative dispute resolution (ADR) proceedings.168 A
tribal court, much like an ADR proceeding, provides a relaxed environment where
the parties can work out an equitable agreement.' 69 Also, the tribal court would
not be bound by precedent in the same way as a state court.' 70 In this case, the
tribal judge would have been able take into account the parties' negotiations and
the fairness of the process itself to discover whether there was a waiver. Histori-
cally, courts hearing cases by their own sovereign bodies have provided a neutral
playing field. 171 In fact, tribal courts may be even more likely to enforce an arbi-
tration award. 17 2 This means that C & W Enterprises could have brought the en-
forcement action in Tribal Court without fear that the Tribal Court would be fixed
against their interests.
Having the enforcement action in Tribal Court rather than state court may al-
so prevent the strain on future business relationships. 73  Maintaining a future
relationship is a key advantage of ADR, and it seems a worthy cause to seek this
continued relationship in later proceedings. 174 This would be beneficial to both
parties. Deferring action to tribal courts would not be an entirely new concept.
Through the "tribal exhaustion doctrine," federal courts generally require that all
tribal remedies be exhausted before bringing action in federal court against tri-
bes. 175 With the benefits that tribal courts can provide in the ADR context, the
parties would have been best served by pursuing the enforcement action in Oglala
Tribal Court. Rather than implying that the Tribe submitted to AAA rules, requir-
ing the parties to pursue the enforcement action in Tribal Court would have better
followed the contract's language and furthered public policy objectives. 17
6
168. See Pat Sekaquaptewa, Tribal Courts and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 18 Bus. L. TODAY 23,
25 (2008).
169. See George D. Watson, Jr., The Oglala Sioux Tribal Court: From Termination to Self-
Determination, 3 GREAT PLAINS RES. 61, 82 (1993), available at http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1084&context=greatplainsresearch. "The Oglala tribal court is very infor-
mal compared to off-reservation courts. While judges recently began wearing robes and the main court
room has an appearance of formality, most of the proceedings are conducted in an atmosphere that is
relaxed and flexible." id.
170. See Sekaquaptewa, supra note 168, at 23; see Watson, supra note 169, at 83. "The court is not
heavily bound by any body of precedent which allows the court to exercise broad discretion and lati-
tude in reaching its decisions." Id. at 83.
171. See Struve, supra note 12, at 179.
The history and current framework of state and federal government waivers of immunity belie
the notion that a sovereign's courts will necessarily be impermissibly biased: Both the federal
government and the states have chosen to waive immunity only in their own courts, and, in many
instances, only in courts specially designated for the purpose of hearing claims against the gov-
emnment.
Id.
172. See Sekaquaptewa, supra note 168, at 24. "Because tribal leaders and judges tend to view media-
tion and arbitration as similar to traditional authority dispute resolution processes, they are inclined to
enforce settlements and awards as a matter of public policy." Id.
173. See id. at 25. "Many tribal judges view ADR solutions as in line with custom and tradition. Non-
Native clients that live in or do business in Indian Country seek to maintain long-term working rela-
tionships in the tribal community. The use of tribally supported and enforced ADR actively furthers
both clients' long-term interests and tribal sovereignty." Id.
174. See Charles P. Lickson, The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Intellectual Property,
Technology-Related or Innovation-Based Disputes, 55 AM. JUR. Trial §73 (2008).
175. See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 15-16 (1987).
176. See Struve, supra note 12, at 181-82.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Oglala continued the Su-
preme Court's path of chipping away at the tribal sovereignty doctrine by extend-
ing waiver to tribal participation in the legal process.' 77 Additionally, the court
ignored possible traditional tribal forums that could have reviewed the arbitration
award and allowed tribal issues, generally considered a federal concern, to be
enforced in state court. 178 While advocates indicate that tribal sovereign immunity
is essential to a Tribe's independent government, recent cases show that courts are
willing to apply the doctrine narrowly. 179 Even as the courts narrowly apply the
doctrine, they are unlikely to overthrow the entirety of the doctrine and the
precedent established over many years.' In order to maintain the courts' policy
objectives and keep a tribe involved in issues that affect its own, courts should
look at tribal courts as potentially receptive forums. 18  Oglala is just one indica-
tion that courts are still continuing to try and flesh out how far tribal immunity
will stretch.' 82 As long as there remains uncertainty, inconsistent decisions in
differing jurisdictions are likely to impair tribal functions. 83
CHRISTOPHER MCMILLIN
The increasing availability of tribal-court remedies against tribal entities might well escape the
notice of the Supreme Court, which lacks the resources, and perhaps the inclination, to investi-
gate the rich variation in tribal judicial remedies and proceedings. Congress, however, has the ca-
pacity to gather data on the development of tribal governments; if the political impetus to abro-
gate tribal immunity resurfaces, it is to be hoped that Congress will make use of that capacity and
will not abrogate tribal immunity from suit in non-tribal court in instances where tribes provide
appropriate remedies in their own courts."
Id.
177. Oglala Sioux Tribe v. C & W Enters., 542 F.3d 224, 231 (8th Cir. 2008).
178. Id.
179. See Laakkonen, supra note 57, at 511. "The First Circuit demonstrates the possible trend toward
abrogation of tribal immunity, with Justice Scalia's opinion in Hicks being the means to do so." Id.
180. See Seielstad, supra note 64, at 713-714.
However, in light of the historical development of the doctrine, including the consistent way in
which it has been integrated into the federal common law and the context in which the court ren-
dered its opinion in Kiowa Tribe, it is reasonable to conclude that the doctrine is an intrinsic part
of the jurisprudence of tribal sovereignty and likely to resist dramatic change in the hands of the
federal judiciary. Kiowa Tribe and its predecessors reflect the federal government's long-time
recognition of tribal sovereignty and its inherent attributes and are enduring proof of the strength
and durability of tribal sovereignty.
Id.
181. See generally Sekaquaptewa, supra note 168.
182. See generally Thomas P. McLish, Note, Tribal Sovereign Immunity: Searching for Sensible
Limits, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 173 (1988); Kenton Keller Pettit, Note, The Waiver of Tribal Sovereign
Immunity in the Contractual Context: Conflict Between the Ninth Circuit and Alaska Supreme Court,
10 ALASKA L. REV. 363 (1993).
183. See Ogden v. Iowa Tribe, 250 S.W.3d 822, 827 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008) (discussing the contrary
results that courts have reached on whether a "sue and be sued" provision waives a tribes immunity);
see also Ann K. Wooster, Application of the Indian Reorganization Act, 30 A.L.R. FED. 2D 1 (2008).
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